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 150 ANALYSIS
 The real question is: what produces these conflicting inclina-
 tions, to believe thatamoves, and that it doesn't, at the same time?
 I think the answer is that motion includes two distinct concepts,
 each with its own perceptual mechanism: moving (motion at an
 instant), and having moved (being in different places at different
 times). We know we can see that a has moved without ever seeing
 it moving; and the converse is also true. We know we can see
 something moving without seeing that it's moved, since, as we
 know, a moving object can catch our eye when a stationary one
 wouldn't. In other words, we have an independent perceptual
 mechanism for seeing things moving. It may, of course, take time:
 aybe we can't see absolutely instantaneous motion. But the
 mechanism can still show us perceptibly instantaneous motion:
 that is, motion over an imperceptibly small time span, which we
 conceive to be instantaneous. And when this mechanism (rightly
 or wrongly) shows us a moving, it will naturally incline us also to
 believe that a has moved: since moving for any finite time entails
 having moved. So it also inclines us to believe simply that a moves:
 it gives us a perceptual experience whose content is Fa. And
 normally, of course, when that experience is veridical, it will be
 confirmed by the mechanism which shows us that, over a
 perceptible time span, a has moved. But it needn't be so
 confirmed; and in the Waterfall Illusion, it isn't: the two mechan-
 isms simultaneously give us conflicting perceptual experiences.
 In short, not only must we credit the Waterfall Illusion
 experience with containing the concept F, in order to explain its
 contradictory content, we can. So we should. It is an illusion to
 suppose, as Crane does, that this illusion shows perceptual
 experience not to be composed of concepts.'
 Darwin College, ? D. H. MELLOR 1988
 Cambridge CB3 9EU
 'Notwithstanding our disagreement, the above owes much to Mr Crane's replies
 to my earlier criticisms of his paper.
 CONCEPTS IN PERCEPTION
 By TIM CRANE
 I CAN agree with much of what D. H. Mellor says in his response
 to my paper ('Crane's Waterfall Illusion' ANALYSIS, above pp.
 147-152). I can agree that perception in some sense 'aims' at truth,
 that its function 'is to tell us how the world truly is' (p. 149). I can
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 agree that perception normally inclines us to believe that what is
 perceived is the case - we normally believe what we see. And I
 can agree with Mellor's proposal that the ability to perceive
 motion might be the product of two distinct but related mechan-
 isms. The disagreement between us is over the tentative conclu-
 sion I drew from my reflections on the Waterfall Illusion: that the
 content of perception is not composed of concepts. Mellor seems
 to be sceptical about the thesis that there could be a state with a
 content which is not composed of concepts. On the face of it,
 there is something odd about this thesis, since concepts are often
 defined as the constituents of contents. If I am to defend my read-
 ing of the Waterfall Illusion, I must try and make this thesis more
 palatable.
 The substance of Mellor's criticism is that the content of the
 illusion should not be constructed (as I construe it) as Fa & -Fa,
 but as the conjunction of two distinct contents, Fa and - Fa, each
 of which the perceiver is inclined to believe. One of these inclina-
 tions, as it were, 'wins out', presumably because of its support from
 other beliefs and perceptions. In my paper I argued that the
 problem for those who believe that the content of perception is
 conceptual arises because the Waterfall Illusion is an experience
 with a single contradictory content. On Mellor's interpretation of
 the illusion, this problem simply does not arise. His concern is to
 preserve the equation of perception with an inclination to believe,
 in order to capture the sense in which perception 'aims' at truth,
 for this sense (while distinct) cannot be unrelated to the sense in
 which belief aims at truth.
 But I doubt whether this is the whole story. How can the notion
 of an inclination to believe capture what is distinctive about the
 content of perception? In particular, how can it explain the
 general fact (of which the Waterfall Illusion is an illustration) that,
 unlike beliefs, the contents of one's perceptual states cannot be
 revised in response to further evidence? If perceptions were simply
 inclinations to believe, one would expect that the inclination
 which 'loses' (in our case, that a is moving) would no longer be
 present to the mind. This is surely so with non-perceptual inclina-
 tions to believe: once conclusive evidence is presented against
 one's (non-perceptual) inclination to believe that p, it would be
 irrational to continue to be inclined to believe that p. But in the
 case of the Waterfall Illusion, the (alleged) inclination to believe
 that a is moving remains even after conclusive evidence has been
 assembled against it. So the question remains: what distinguishes
 the perceptual inclination from the non-perceptual one?
 I can concede that perceptions normally involve an inclination to
 believe. But to say this is just to say that perceptions are generally
 reliable in the production of beliefs; and this is not news. The real
 question, as Mellor says, is how phenomena like the Waterfall
 Illusion come about, and what they tell us about the distinction
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 between perception and belief. Mellor has a proposal about this,
 which (in part) I find plausible: the perception of motion is the
 result of two mechanisms, corresponding to the ideas of moving
 and having moved. Mellor thinks that these two mechanisms deliver
 perceptual experiences whose contents are composed of concepts;
 I do not. But if I am to be right about the content of perception,
 then I have to explain why not; that is, I have to explain how a
 perception that p can have the content p without being composed
 of the concepts that the belief that p is.
 This explanation can only be complete when an adequate
 account of the possession of concepts is given; here I can only
 gesture at such an account. It is well known that the picture of
 perception suggested by much recent work in the philosophy and
 psychology of perception (and to my mind, supported by the exist-
 ence of the Waterfall Illusion) is that of the perceptual system as
 an information processor. The system is in states with informational
 content, and they normally produce beliefs which have those very
 same contents. This idea is quite innocuous: the perception that p
 normally produces the belief that p.
 When we have beliefs, their contents are composed of concepts;
 we possess (whatever this might mean) the concepts which are the
 constituents of the contents. It may appear that the perception
 that p is composed of the concepts that the belief that p is. But this
 is a mistake, resulting from assimilating the nature of belief to the
 nature of perception. On the picture I favour, the possession of
 concepts is part of what marks the distinction between someone
 who has genuine beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) and a
 mere information processor. The contents of the states of the
 perceptual system are, of course, describable (by a theorist) in terms
 of certain concepts, but the system does not possess those concepts.
 It is not a thinker or an agent, and has no propositional attitudes.
 It is in states with content in the way that a thermometer is: a
 thermometer can indicate that the temperature is 70 degrees with-
 out possessing the concept of a degree, or of temperature. There is
 no general problem about things being in such states - the per-
 ceptual system is just another instance. As I see it, one of the
 attractions for the philosophy of mind of the idea of an informa-
 tion processing theory of a perceptual system (e.g. the auditory or
 visual systems) is the possibility of an explanation of how per-
 ceivers can come to be in states of a certain kind in virtue of their
 perceptual systems being states of other kinds. (A simple analogy
 might help: our lungs expand and contract, and because they do
 so, we breathe. But the lungs do not breathe.)
 However, it may be responded that although perceptual systems
 are not possessors of concepts, perceivers do need to possess
 (perhaps tacitly) the concepts which can be used to characterize
 the informational output of the perceptual systems, in order to
 have beliefs based on perception. I do not agree. For one thing, this
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 response rests on a dubious notion of concept possession, which
 entirely obscures the well-established distinction between personal
 and sub-personal psychological states. For another, it is prima facie
 implausible to suppose that perceivers need to possess the con-
 cepts which can be used to characterize the content of perceptual
 states, in order to be in those states. Of course, someone who
 knows a lot about (say) the visual system will possess these con-
 cepts, but he will not need to possess them in order to see. Infor-
 mation-processing theories of vision (such as David Marr's (1982))
 attribute contents to states of the visual system which are
 extremely complex; it is implausible to suppose that a perceiver
 must be a master of the concepts involved in these contents in
 order for his visual system to be in those states (for a discussion of
 this sort of point, see Davies 1986, p. 144). In my view, it is more
 plausible to suppose that belief formation conceptualizes the
 content of perceptual states. In the Waterfall case, the output of
 the visual system is a contradiction, perhaps because (a) of a
 failure of the mechanism (perhaps in the way Mellor describes);
 and (b) because the states of the visual system are 'informationally
 encapsulated' in Fodor's sense. (This answers Mellor's query (p.
 147) about what entitles me to talk about contradictions at all; the
 contradiction - one which a believer would naturally describe as
 Fa & - Fa, though the information-processing theory would give
 a more complex description - is actually in the informational out-
 put of the visual system.) It seems to me that this picture of the
 structure of perception suggests the possibility of a clearer expla-
 nation than belief-theories give of why the contents of perceptual
 states cannot be revised in response to further evidence. But much
 more must be said about concept possession before it can be
 universally accepted that the Waterfall Illusion is evidence for the
 accuracy of this picture.
 Peterhouse ? TIM CRANE 1988
 Cambridge CB2 1RD
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